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Abstract. Existing literature continues to be unable to offer a convincing explana-
tion for the volatility of the stochastic discount factor in real world data. Our work
provides such an explanation. We do not rely on frictions, market incompleteness or
transactions costs of any kind. Instead, we modify a simple stochastic representa-
tive agent model by allowing for birth and death and by allowing for heterogeneity
in agents’ discount factors. We show that these two minor and realistic changes
to the timeless Arrow-Debreu paradigm are sufficient to invalidate the implication
that competitive financial markets efficiently allocate risk. Our work demonstrates
that financial markets, by their very nature, cannot be Pareto efficient, except by
chance. Although individuals in our model are rational; markets are not.
I. Introduction
Discount rates vary a lot more than we thought. Most of the puzzles
and anomalies that we face amount to discount-rate variation we do
not understand. Our theoretical controversies are about how discount
rates are formed. Cochrane (2011, Page 1091).
Since the work of Paul Samuelson and Eugene Fama, writing in the 1960’s, (Samuel-
son, 1963; Fama, 1963, 1965a,b), the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) has been
the starting point for any discussion of the role of financial markets in the allocation
of risk. In his 1970 review article, Fama (1970) defines an efficient financial market
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as one that “reflects all available information”. If markets are efficient in this sense,
uninformed traders cannot hope to profit from clever trading strategies. To reflect
that idea we say there is “no free lunch”.
Although the efficient markets hypothesis is primarily about the inability to make
money in financial markets, there is a second implication of the EMH that follows
from the first welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory; this is the idea that
complete, competitive financial markets lead to Pareto efficient allocations. Richard
Thaler, (2009), writing in a review of Justin Fox’s (2009) book, The Myth of the
Rational Market, refers to this second dimension of the EMH as “the price is right”.
We argue here that unregulated financial markets do not lead to Pareto efficient
outcomes, except by chance, and that the failure of complete financial markets to
deliver socially efficient allocations has nothing to do with financial constraints, trans-
actions costs or barriers to trade. We show that the first welfare theorem fails in any
model of financial markets that reflects realistic population demographics. Although
individuals in our model are rational; markets are not.
In their seminal paper, Cass and Shell (1983) differentiate between uncertainty
generated by shocks to preferences, technology or endowments – intrinsic uncertainty
– and shocks that do not affect any of the economic fundamentals – extrinsic un-
certainty. When consumption allocations differ in the face of extrinsic uncertainty,
Cass and Shell say that sunspots matter. Our paper demonstrates that the existence
of equilibria with extrinsic uncertainty has important practical implications for real
world economies. We show that sunspots really do matter: And they matter in a big
way in any model that is calibrated to fit realistic probabilities of birth and death.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections II and III explain how our findings are
connected with the literature on the excess volatility of stock market prices. Section
IV provides an informal description of our model along with a description of our
main results. Section V provides a series of definitions, lemmas and propositions
that formalize our results. Section VI discusses the implications of our work for the
equity premium puzzle. In Section VII, we provide some computer simulations of
the invariant distribution implied by our model for a particular calibration. Finally,
Section VIII presents a short conclusion and a summary of our main ideas.
II. Related literature
Writing in the early 1980s, Leroy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) showed
that the stock market is too volatile to be explained by the asset pricing equations
associated with complete, frictionless financial markets. The failure of the frictionless
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Arrow-Debreu model to explain the volatility of asset prices in real world data is
referred to in the literature as ‘excess volatility’.
To explain excess volatility in financial markets, some authors introduce financial
frictions that prevent rational agents from exploiting Pareto improving trades. Ex-
amples include, Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 2001); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1996) and Carlstom and Fuerst (1997) who have developed models where net worth
interacts with agency problems to create a financial accelerator.
An alternative way to introduce excess volatility to asset markets is to drop as-
pects of the rational agents assumption. Examples of this approach include Barsky
and DeLong (1993), who introduce noise traders, Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja
(2010) who study models of learning where agents do not have rational expectations
and Lansing (2010), who describes bubbles that are ‘near-rational’ by dropping the
transversality condition in an infinite horizon framework.
It is also possible to explain excess volatility by moving away from a standard
representation of preferences as the maximization of a time separable Von-Neuman
Morgenstern expected utility function. Examples include the addition of habit per-
sistence in preferences as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the generalization to
non time-separable preferences as in Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and the models of
behavioral finance surveyed by Barberis and Thaler (2003).
In a separate approach, a large body of literature follows Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
who developed a model where liquidity matters as a result of credit constraints. A
list of papers, by no means comprehensive, that uses related ideas to explain financial
volatility and its effects on economic activity would include the work of Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003); Brunnermeir (2012); Brunnermeir and Sannikov (2012); Farmer
(2013); Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008); Geanakoplos (2010); Miao and Wang (2012);
Gu and Wright (2010) and Rochetau and Wright (2010).
There is a further literature which includes papers by Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2006); Fahri and Tirole (2011) and Martin and Ventura (2011, 2012), that explains
financial volatility and its effects using the overlapping generations model. Our work
differs from this literature. Although we use a version of the overlapping generations
framework, our results do not rely on frictions of any kind.
Models of financial frictions have received considerable attention in the wake of
the 2008 recession. But models in this class have not yet been able to provide a
convincing explanation for the size and persistence of the rate of return shocks that
are required to explain large financial crises. The importance of shocks of this kind is
highlighted by the work of Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2012), who estimate a
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dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a financial sector. They find that
a shock they refer to as a “risk shock” is the most important driver of business cycles.
In effect, the risk shock changes the rate at which agents discount the future.
New Keynesian explanations of financial crises also rely on a discount rate shock
and, to explain the data following major financial crises, this shock must be large and
persistent (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2002; Eggertsson, 2011). Eggertsson (2011), for
example, requires a 5.47% annualized shock to the time preference factor to account
for the large output and inflation declines that occurred following the stock market
crash of 1929.
The literature that we have reviewed in this section continues to be unable to
offer a convincing explanation for volatility of the stochastic discount factor of the
magnitude that is required to explain real world data. Our work provides such an
explanation. Our explanation is simple and general and the logic of our argument
applies to any model of financial markets with realistic population demographics.
We do not rely on frictions, market incompleteness or transactions costs of any
kind. Instead, we modify a simple stochastic representative agent model by allowing
for birth and death and by allowing for heterogeneity in agents’ discount factors. We
show that these two minor, and realistic, changes to the timeless Arrow-Debreu par-
adigm are sufficient to invalidate the implication that competitive financial markets
efficiently allocate risk. Our work demonstrates that financial markets, by their very
nature, cannot be Pareto efficient, except by chance. Financial markets do not work
well in the real world.
III. Why equilibria are inefficient
Inefficiency occurs in overlapping generations models for two reasons. The first,
is dynamic inefficiency that occurs because there is a double infinity of agents and
commodities. The second is sunspot inefficiency that occurs because agents are unable
to insure against events that occur before they are born.
It has long been understood that the overlapping generations model, (Allais 1947,
Samuelson 1958) leads to equilibria that are dynamically inefficient.1 The cause of
that inefficiency was identified by Shell (1971) who showed that, even if all agents
could trade contingent commodities at the beginning of time, the non-stochastic OLG
1See Malinvaud (1987) for a discussion of the genesis of the history of the overlapping generations
model. Although the model is often attributed to Samuelson (1958) it appears earlier in the Appendix
2 to Allais’ book, Economie et Intérêt (1947). Allais also provides the first discussion of the optimal
rate of capital accumulation, later known as the Golden Rule (Swan 1956, Phelps 1961).
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model would still contain equilibria that are dynamically inefficient. The first welfare
theorem fails in that environment because the wealth of all individuals is finite in
an inefficient equilibrium even when social wealth is unbounded. We do not rely on
dynamic inefficiency in this paper and, in the absence of uncertainty, our model has
a unique dynamically efficient equilibrium.
The second source of inefficiency in overlapping generations models arises from the
absence of insurance opportunities. In their (1983) paper, Cass and Shell showed
that equilibria may be inefficient if some agents are unable to participate in markets
that open before they are born and Azariadis (1981) provided a dynamic example
of a model where sunspots influence economic activity.2 The example that Cass and
Shell provided in the body of their paper relied on the existence of multiple equilibria
in the underlying, non-stochastic economy. As a result, the majority of the work on
sunspots that followed Azariadis and Cass and Shell has sought to construct examples
of models where there are multiple equilibria in the underlying economy as in the work
of Farmer and Woodford (1984, 1997), Benhabib and Farmer (1994); Farmer and Guo
(1994) and Wen (1998).
We depart from this literature. Unlike previous papers that have constructed cal-
ibrated examples of sunspot models, our work does not rely on randomizing over
the multiple equilibria of an underlying non-stochastic model. Instead, as in Farmer
(2012b), and the example constructed in the appendix to Cass and Shell (1983),
equilibrium in the non-stochastic version of our model is unique.
Angeletos and La’O (2011) and Benhabib, Wang, and Wen (2012) also construct
sunspot models where there is a unique underlying equilibrium. Unlike their work,
however, our model does not rely on informational frictions, nor do we assume that
there are credit constraints, borrowing constraints or liquidity constraints. Our only
departure from a frictionless, timeless, Arrow Debreu model is the assumption that
agents cannot participate in financial markets that open before they are born.
When agents have realistic death probabilities and discount factors ranging from
2% to 10%, we find that the human wealth of new-born agents can differ by a factor
of 25% depending on whether they are born into a boom or into a recession. These
numbers are similar in magnitude to the long-term costs of job loss reported by Davis
2Cass and Shell (1983) distinguished between ex ante and ex post optimality. Ex post optimality
distinguishes between the same person, call him Mr. A (S) who is born into state of the world S
and Mr. A (S′) who is the same person born into the state of the world S′. Using an ex post Pareto
criterion, sunspot equilibria are Pareto optimal because people born into different states of the world
are different people. In this paper, we adopt an ex-ante definition of Pareto efficiency.
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and Von Wachter (2012) in their study of the effects of severe recessions. Although
we do not provide an explicit model of unemployment in this paper, related work
by Farmer (2012a,c, 2013), Farmer and Plotnikov (2012) and Plotnikov (2012) does
provide a mechanism that translates asset price shocks into persistent unemployment.
In conjunction with these related papers, our work provides an explanation for the
large welfare costs of business cycles that Davis and Von-Wachter find in the data.
Our work has important implications for the appropriate role of central bank inter-
vention in financial markets. Farmer (2012b) argues that the inefficiency of competi-
tive financial markets provides a justification for central bank intervention to stabilize
asset prices. That argument applies, a fortiori, to the environment we develop here.
IV. An informal description of the environment
This section provides an informal description of our model. We study a pure trade
economy with a stochastic aggregate endowment, ωt, that we refer to interchangeably
as income or GDP. Our economy is populated by patient type 1 agents and impatient
type 2 agents. Time is discrete and, as in Blanchard (1985), both types survive into
period t + 1 with age invariant probability pi. Each type maximizes the expected
present discounted value of a logarithmic utility function. These assumptions allow
us to find simple expressions for the aggregate consumption of type i ∈ {1, 2} as a
function of type i’s wealth.
We model a stationary population by assuming that in every period a fraction
(1− pi) of each type dies and is replaced by a fraction (1− pi) of newborns of the
same type. Agents are selfish and do not leave bequests to their descendents. Type 1
agents own a fraction µ of the aggregate endowment and type 2 agents own a fraction
1− µ.
We assume that there is a perfect annuities market, mediated by a set of com-
petitive, zero-profit, financial intermediaries. Agents borrow and lend to financial
intermediaries at a gross interest rate that exceeds the market rate. If an agent dies
with positive financial wealth, the agent’s assets are returned to the financial inter-
mediary and, on the other side of this market, agents who borrow are required to
take out life insurance contracts that settle their debts when they die.
IV.1. Our main results. In an earlier paper, (Farmer, Nourry, and Venditti, 2011),
we derived an explicit expression for the price of an Arrow security (Arrow, 1964) that
can be applied to stochastic versions of Blanchard’s (1985) perpetual youth model.
Here, we apply our earlier result to characterize equilibria as a pair of stochastic
difference equations in two state variables that we call z1,t and zt.
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The variable z1,t is the present discounted value of the endowment of all living type
1 agents, divided by aggregate GDP. The variable zt is the present discounted value
of the endowments of all living agents, (both type 1 and type 2) divided by aggregate
GDP. We call these variables, the type 1 human wealth ratio and the aggregate human
wealth ratio.
Let St be a vector of random variables realized at date t that may be influenced
by either intrinsic or extrinsic uncertainty and let St ≡ {S0, S1...St} be the history of
realizations of S from date 0 to date t. Subscripts denote date t realizations of S and
superscripts denote histories.
We define the pricing kernel, Qt+1t (St+1) to be the price paid at date t in history
St, in units of consumption, for delivery of one unit of the consumption commodity
at date t+ 1 in state St+1. We define a second variable
(1) Q˜t+1t
(
St+1
)
= Qt+1t
(
St+1
) γ (St+1)
ψ (St+1)
,
where
(2) γ
(
St+1
) ≡ ωt+1 (St+1)
ωt (St)
,
is endowment growth in history St+1 and
(3) ψ
(
St+1
)
,
is the probability that state St+1 occurs conditional on history St. We refer to
Q˜t+1t (S
t+1) as the normalized pricing kernel.
Using the results of Farmer, Nourry, and Venditti (2011) we derive an expression
for the normalized pricing kernel as a function of the aggregate human wealth ratio
at date t and the type 1 human wealth ratio at date t+ 1,
(4) Q˜t+1t = Q˜ (zt, z1,t+1) .
By applying this expression to the definitions of the type 1 human wealth ratio and to
the aggregate human wealth ratio, we are able to characterize equilibria as solutions
to the following pair of stochastic difference equations,
(5) z1,t = µ+ Et
{
piQ˜ (zt, z1,t+1) z1,t+1
}
,
(6) zt = 1 + Et
{
piQ˜ (zt, z1,t+1) zt+1
}
.
Notice that, although the endowment fluctuates, Equations (5) and (6) do not
explicitly involve terms in the random aggregate endowment. Although human wealth
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is a random variable, there is an equilibrium in which the human wealth ratio is not.
This equilibrium is represented by a non-stochastic solution to Equations (5) and (6).
Not all sequences that solve equations (5) and (6) are consistent with market clear-
ing because very high or very low values of human wealth would require negative
consumption of one of the two types. If a sequence is consistent with an interior
equilibrium at all points in time we say that the solution is admissible. We prove
that the non-stochastic system represented by the equations
(7) z1,t = µ+ piQ˜ (zt, z1,t+1) z1,t+1,
(8) zt = 1 + piQ˜ (zt, z1,t+1) zt+1,
has a unique admissible steady state which is a saddle. We show further that the
model has a single initial condition represented by the financial assets of type 1
agents at date 0. It follows, that the model has a unique fundamental equilibrium,
represented by the stable branch of the saddle.
We derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equation that characterizes this
equilibrium. This solution is a first order difference equation in zt, found by replacing
z1,t in Equations (7) and (8) with the equality,
(9) z1,t = µzt,
at all dates. This substitution leads to a function, g (·) for the stable branch of the
saddle which is found by solving the equation
(10) zt = 1 + piQ˜ (zt, µzt+1) zt+1,
for zt+1 as a function of zt. Given this function, the sequence {zt}, defined as the
unique solution to the difference equation
(11) zt+1 = g (zt) , z0 = z¯0,
is an equilibrium of our model economy. The initial condition is determined by
asset and goods market clearing in the first period and it is natural to impose an
initial condition where agents of type 1 and type 2 are each born with zero financial
obligations. We refer to the sequence {zt}, constructed in this way, as the fundamental
equilibrium of our model economy.
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IV.2. Properties of the fundamental equilibrium. The fundamental equilibrium
has the following properties. Given the initial value z0, human wealth converges to
a unique steady state value, z∗, and once this steady state has been reached, the
normalized pricing kernel remains constant at a fixed value Q˜∗.
Recall that the pricing kernel is defined by the expression,
(12) Qt+1t = Q˜
∗ γ
ψ
,
where Q˜∗ is the value of the normalized pricing kernel at the steady state. This
equation implies that, in the fundamental equilibrium, the price of an Arrow security
will fluctuate in proportion to shocks to the stochastic endowment process. This
mirrors the pricing equation associated with a representative agent economy where
the agent has logarithmic preferences and where Q˜∗ plays the role of the representative
agent’s discount factor.
In the fundamental equilibrium, all uncertainty is intrinsic. Newborn agents trade
a complete set of Arrow securities with financial intermediaries and, depending on
type, these agents may start life as net borrowers (these are the type 2 agents) or
net lenders, (these are the type 1 agents). As time progresses, the measure of agents
born at date t shrinks exponentially. Long-lived type 1 agents eventually consume
more than their endowments as they accumulate financial assets. Long-lived type 2
agents eventually consume less than their endowments as they devote an ever larger
fraction of their incomes to debt repayment.
IV.3. Equilibria where sunspots matter. In addition to the unique fundamen-
tal equilibrium, our model has many sunspot equilibria, represented by stochastic
processes for zt that satisfy the following analog of Equation (10).
(13) zt = 1 + Et
{
piQ˜ (zt, µzt+1) zt+1
}
.
For example, let εs,t+1 be a bounded random variable, with mean 1, and consider
the equation
(14) (zt − 1) εs,t+1 = piQ˜ (zt, µzt+1) zt+1.
Let {zt} be a sequence of random variables generated by the expression,
(15) zt+1 = g (zt, εs,t+1) ,
where the function g (z, ε) is obtained by solving Equation (14) for zt+1 as a function
of zt and εs,t+1. By taking expectations of Equation (14), using the assumption that
the conditional mean of εs,t+1 is equal to one, it follows that this sequence satisfies
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Equation (13). Since this equation completely characterizes equilibrium sequences, it
follows that our economy admits sunspot equilibria.
Business cycles in our model are generated, not only by intrinsic shocks to GDP
growth, but also by sunspot shocks. For plausible values of the parameters of the
model, we show that the aggregate human wealth ratio can differ by 25% at different
points of the business cycle. If we think of a low value of the human wealth ratio as
a recession, a person of either type who is born into a recession, will find that the net
present value of their life-time earnings is 25% lower than if they had been born into
a boom.
V. A formal description of the environment
In this section we provide a formal description of the model. Uncertainty each
period is indexed by a finite set of states S = {S1, . . . , Sn}. Define the set of t-period
histories St recursively as follows:
(16)
S1 = S
St = St−1 × S, t = 2, . . .
We will use St to denote a generic element of S realized at date t, St to denote an
element of St realized at t and |St| to denote the number of elements in St. Let the
probability that St+1 occurs at date t + 1, conditional on history St, be given by
ψ(St+1) and assume that this probability is independent of time.
We define βi to be the discount factor of type i and we assume
(17) 0 < β2 < β1 < 1.
Throughout the paper, we use the following transformed parameters,
(18) Bi ≡ (1− βipi) ,
and from Equation (17) it follows that,
(19) B2 > B1.
A household of type i, born at date j, solves the problem,
(20) maxEj
{ ∞∑
t=j
(piβi)
t−j log cji,t
(
St
)}
,
such that
(21)
|S|∑
St+1∈ S
piQt+1t
(
St+1
)
aji,t+1
(
St+1
) ≤ aji,t (St)+ ωi,t (St)− cji,t (St) , t = j, ...
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(22) aji,j
(
Sj
)
= 0.
The solution to this problem satisfies the Euler equation
(23) Qt+1t
(
St+1
)
=
ψ(St+1)βic
j
i,t (S
t)
cji,t+1 (S
t+1)
,
for each history St and each of its |S| successors St+1, where cji,t (St) is the consumption
at date t in history St, of a member of type i, born at date j, and aji,t (St) is the agent’s
financial wealth.
Let hi,t (St) be type i′s human wealth, defined as
(24) hi,t
(
St
)
= ωi,t
(
St
)
+ pi
∑
St+1
Qt+1t
(
St+1
)
hi,t+1
(
St+1
)
, t = 0, ...
Since each member of type i has the same endowments and the same probability of
dying, the human wealth of all members of type i will be the same across generations.
We assume that
(25) lim
T→∞
piT−1QTT−1
(
ST
)
ωi,T
(
ST
)
= 0, for all ST ∈ ST ,
which implies that human wealth is well defined and can be represented as the net
present value of future endowments summed over all possible future histories,
(26) hi,t
(
St
)
=
∞∑
τ=t
|Sτ |∑
Sτ∈Sτ
piτ−tQτt (S
τ )ωi,τ (S
τ ) .
Using these results and the properties of logarithmic preferences, we have that,
(27) cji,t
(
St
)
= Bi
[
aji,t
(
St
)
+ hji,t
(
St
)]
.
Next, we apply the methods developed in Farmer, Nourry, and Venditti (2011) to
find the following expression for the pricing kernel,
Proposition 1. The pricing kernel can be expressed as
(28) Qt+1t
(
St+1
)
=
ψ (St+1) (1−Bi) ci,t (St)
ci,t+1 (St+1)−Bi (1− pi)hi,t+1 (St+1) ,
where ci,t (St) is the aggregate consumption of all agents of type i alive at date t in
history St and hi,t+1 (St+1) is the human wealth of agents of type i at date t + 1 in
history St+1.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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V.1. Competitive equilibria. In this section, we find simple expressions for the
equations that define an equilibrium. We begin by normalizing the variables of our
model by the aggregate endowment, ωt (St). Since this is an endowment economy,
this variable is our measure of GDP, equal to income; hence we refer to this procedure
as normalizing by income.
Let At be the index set of all agents alive at date t. Using this definition, we
aggregate the consumption function, Equation (27) over all agents of type i alive at
date t, and divide by income to generate the following expression,
(29) λi,t
(
St
)
= Bi
[
αi,t
(
St
)
+ zi,t
(
St
)]
.
The terms
λi,t
(
St
)
=
∑
j∈At c
j
i,t (S
t)
ωt (St)
, αi,t (St) =
∑
j∈At a
j
i,t (S
t)
ωt (St)
,(30)
and zi,t
(
St
)
=
∑
j∈At h
j
i,t (S
t)
ωt (St)
,
represent consumption, financial wealth, and human wealth of all members of type i,
expressed as fractions of GDP. We refer to these variables as the consumption share,
the asset ratio and the human wealth ratio for type i.
Since there are two types of agents, we define
(31) λt
(
St
) ≡ λ1,t (St) ,
and we refer to λt (St) as simply, the consumption share. From the goods market
clearing equation, the consumption shares of the two types must sum to unity, which
implies that the consumption share of type 2 agents is given by the expression,
(32) λ2,t(St) = 1− λt(St).
Similarly, we refer to
αt
(
St
) ≡ α1,t (St) ,
as the asset ratio, since from the asset market clearing equation, the financial assets
of type 1 agents must equal the financial liabilities of type 2 agents, and
(33) α2,t
(
St
)
= −αt
(
St
)
.
Corresponding to the definition of λt (St) as the share of income consumed by type
1 agents, we will define µ,
(34) µ =
ω1,t
ωt
, 1− µ = ω2,t
ωt
,
to be the share of income owned by type 1 agents.
THE INEFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS 13
Using these newly defined terms, we have the following definition of a competitive
equilibrium.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences for the consumption
share, {λt (St)}, the asset ratio {αt (St)}, and the human wealth ratios {z1,t (St)}
and {zt (St)} and a sequence of Arrow security prices
{
Qt+1t (S
t+1)
}
such that each
household of each generation maximizes expected utility, taking their budget con-
straint and the sequence of Arrow security prices as given and the goods and asset
markets clear. An equilibrium is admissible if {λt (St)} ∈ (0, 1) for all St.
In the remainder of the paper, we drop the explicit dependence of λt, αt, ωt, ct, c1,t
and Qt on St to make the notation more readable.
V.2. Equilibria with intrinsic uncertainty. In their paper, ‘Do Sunspots Mat-
ter?’ Cass and Shell (1983) distinguish between intrinsic uncertainty and extrinsic
uncertainty. Intrinsic uncertainty in our model is captured by endowment fluctua-
tions. In this section, we study the case where this is the only kind of uncertainty
to influence the economy. Before characterizing equilibrium sequences, we prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let za = 1/B2 and zb = 1/B1 and recall that B2 > B1. There exists
an increasing affine function ζ : Zˆ ≡ [za, zb] → [0, 1] such that for all values of the
aggregate human wealth ratio, z ∈ Zˆ the equilibrium consumption share λ ∈ [0, 1] is
given by the expression
(35) λ = ζ (z) ≡ B1B2
B2 −B1
(
z − 1
B2
)
.
Define the real number
(36) θ0 = B1 (B2 −B1) .
Then, in a competitive equilibrium, the aggregate human wealth ratio zt, the human
wealth ratio of type 1, z1,t and the asset share αt, are related by the affine function,
(37) θ0z1,t −B1B2zt + θ0αt +B1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Using Lemma 1, we establish the following Proposition which characterizes the
fundamental equilibrium.
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Proposition 2. Define the real numbers,
θ1 = B2 − pi(1−B1) + µ(1− pi)(B1 −B2),
θ2 = −B2(1− pi)− piB1B2 < 0,(38)
θ3 = (B2 −B1)(1− pi) > 0,
θ4 = B2 − pi (1−B1) = θ1 + µθ3.
In the case when all uncertainty is intrinsic, the following pair of non-stochastic
difference equations describes the evolution of the human wealth ratio of type 1, z1,t,
and of the human wealth ratio, zt, in a competitive equilibrium,
z1,t+1 =
µ− z1,t
θ1 + θ2zt + θ3z1,t
,(39)
zt+1 =
1− zt
θ1 + θ2zt + θ3z1,t
.(40)
In period 0, z1,0 and z0 are linked by the initial condition,
(41) θ0z1,0 −B1B2z0 + θ0α0 +B1 = 0,
where
(42) α0 = α¯0,
is the initial asset ratio. The normalized pricing kernel is related to zt and z1,t by the
expression
(43) Q˜t+1t =
−1
pi
(
θ4 + θ2zt
1 + θ3z1,t+1
)
.
The consumption share λt and the asset ratio, αt are given by equations (44) and
(45),
(44) λt =
B1B2
B2 −B1
(
zt − 1
B2
)
,
(45) αt = −B1
θ0
+
(B1B2 − µθ0)
θ0
zt.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Equations (39) and (40) constitute a two-dimensional system in two variables with
a single initial condition, represented by Equation (41). These equations are non-
stochastic, even when the economy is hit by fundamental shocks, because we have
normalized zt, z1,t and Q˜t+1t by the random endowment. Although ht and h1,t fluctuate
in response to random shocks, zt and z1,t do not.
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Removing the time subscripts from equations (39) and (40) we define a steady state
equilibrium to be a solution to the equations
z1 (θ1 + θ2z + θ3z1) = µ− z1,(46)
z (θ1 + θ2z + θ3z1) = 1− z.(47)
The following proposition characterizes the properties of a steady state equilibrium
and finds two equivalent representations of an equilibrium sequence; one using zt as
a state variable and one using Q˜t+1t .
Proposition 3. Equations (46) and (47) have a unique admissible steady state equi-
librium, {z∗, z∗1} such that z∗ ∈ (za, zb) and z∗1 = µz∗. The Jacobian of the system
(39) and (40), evaluated at {z∗, µz∗}, has two real roots, one less than 1 in absolute
value and one greater than 1. It follows that {z∗, µz∗} is a saddle. The stable branch
of this saddle is described by a set Zˆ ≡ [za, zb] and a function g (·) : Zˆ → Zˆ such that
the first order difference equation
(48) zt+1 = g (zt) ,
where
(49) g(zt) ≡ 1− zt
θ1 + (θ2 + µθ3)zt
,
defines a competitive equilibrium sequence for {zt+1}. For all initial values of z0 and
z1,0 where
(50)
z0 ∈ Zˆ,
z1,0 = µz0,
zt converges to z∗. There is an equivalent representation of equilibrium as a difference
equation in Q˜. In this representation there exists a set Qˆ = [qa, qb] and a function
h (·) : Qˆ→ Qˆ, such that any sequence
{
Q˜t+1t
}
generated by the difference equation
(51) Q˜t+2t+1 = h
(
Q˜t+1t
)
, Q10 ∈ Qˆ,
is a competitive equilibrium sequence. The set Qˆ and the function h (·) are defined
by equations (52) and (53),
(52) qa = −θ1 + (θ2 + µθ3) za
pi
, qb = −θ1 + (θ2 + µθ3) zb
pi
,
(53) h
(
Q˜t+1t
)
≡ 1− θ1
pi
− (1−B1)(1−B2)
piQ˜t+1t
.
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Every sequence generated by Equation (51), converges to the steady state Q˜∗, where
Q˜∗ is defined in Equation (54),
(54) Q˜∗ ≡ −θ1 + (θ2 + µθ3) z
∗
pi
=
1− θ1 +
√
(1 + θ1)2 + 4(θ2 + µθ3)
2pi
.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Proposition 3 implies that the two-dimensional dynamical system in {zt, z1,t} can
be reduced to a one-dimensional difference equation, represented by Equation (49),
which describes the dynamics of the system on the saddle path.
In Figure 1 we have plotted zt+1−zt on the vertical axis and zt on the horizontal axis.
This figure illustrates the dynamics of zt, the human wealth ratio, for a parameterized
example. To construct this figure, we set the survival probability to 0.98, which
implies that the expected lifetime, conditional on being alive today, is 50 years. The
discount factor of type 1 agents is 0.98, the discount factor of type 2 agents is 0.9 and
there are equal shares of each type in the population.
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Figure 1. The dynamics of the human wealth equation
We refer to the area between the two vertical dashed lines, one at za ≡ B−12 and
one at zb ≡ B−11 as Zˆ ≡ [za, zb]; this is the set of admissible initial conditions for an
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interior equilibrium. When z0 is equal to B−12 , λ0 = 0, and type 2 agents consume the
entire endowment. When z0 = B−11 , λ0 = 1, and type 1 agents consume the entire
endowment.
V.3. Equilibria with extrinsic uncertainty. Although we assume that agents are
able to trade a complete set of Arrow securities, that assumption does not insulate the
economy from extrinsic uncertainty. In our model, the human wealth ratio zt and the
normalized pricing kernel Q˜t+1t can fluctuate simply as a consequence of self-fulfilling
beliefs. That idea is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let εs,t be a sunspot random variable with support  ≡ [εa, εb] where
(55) εa =
−[θ4(1− µθ3) + 2θ2] +
√
[θ4(1− µθ3) + 2θ2]2 − θ24(1 + µθ3)2
(1 + µθ3)2
,
(56) εb =
zb(θ4 + θ2zb)
(1− zb)(1 + µθ3zb) ,
and Et [εs,t] = 1. Then there exist sets Z ≡ [z1, zb], and  ≡ [εa, εb] , a function
g (·) : × Z → Z and a stochastic process defined by the equation
(57) zt+1 = g (zt, εs,t+1) ,
where
(58) g (zt, εs,t+1) ≡ (1− zt) εs,t+1
(θ4 − µθ3εs,t+1) + (θ2 + µθ3εs,t+1) zt ,
such that any sequence {zt} generated by (58) for z0 ∈ Z, is a competitive equilibrium
sequence. Further, there is an equivalent representation of equilibrium as the solution
to a stochastic difference equation inQ. In this representation, there exists a function
h (Q, ε′, ε), such that
(59) Q˜t+1t = h
(
Q˜tt−1, εs,t+1, εs,t
)
,
where,
(60) h
(
Q˜tt−1, εs,t+1, εs,t
)
≡ a (εs,t, εs,t+1) + b (εs,t, εs,t+1)
Q˜tt−1
,
(61) a (εs,t, εs,t+1) ≡ 1
pi
{
εs,t (θ2 + µθ3εs,t+1)
(θ2 + µθ3εs,t)
− θ4 + µθ3εs,t+1
}
,
and
(62) b (εs,t, εs,t+1) ≡ 1
pi2
{
εs,t (θ2 + θ4) (θ2 + µθ3εs,t+1)
(θ2 + µθ3εs,t)
}
.
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The sequence
{
Q˜t+1t
}
, generated by a solution to Equation (59), is a competitive
equilibrium sequence for Q.
Proof. See Appendix E. 
Figure 2 illustrates the method used to construct sunspot equilibria. The solid curve
represents the function g (z, 1) and the upper and lower dashed curves represent the
functions g (z, εb) and g (z, εa). We have exaggerated the curvature of the function
g (·) by choosing a value β1 = 0.98 and β2 = 0.3. The large discrepancy between β1
and β2 causes the slopes of these curves to be steeper for low values of z and flatter
for high values, thereby making the graph easier to read.
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Figure 2. The dynamics of sunspot equilibria
Figure 2 also contrasts the admissible set Zˆ ≡ [za, zb] with the support of the in-
variant distribution Z ≡ [z1, zb] . The three vertical dashed lines represent the values
za, z1 and zb. The lower bound of the largest possible invariant distribution, z1 is de-
fined as the point where g (z, εa) is tangent to the 45◦ line. Recall that the admissible
set is the set of values of z for which the consumption of both types is non-negative
and notice that z1 is to the right of za, the lower bound of the admissible set. Figure
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2 illustrates that the support of the largest possible invariant distribution is a subset
of the admissible set. It follows from the results of Futia (1982) that, as ε fluctuates
in the set [εa, εb], z converges to an invariant distribution with support Z ≡ [z1, zb].3
VI. Some Important Implications of our model for asset pricing
In addition to the excess volatility puzzle, the frictionless Arrow Debreu model has
trouble explaining why the return on risky assets is so much higher than the safe return
in U.S. data. This anomaly, first identified by Rajnish Mehra and Edward Prescott
in (1985), is known in the literature as the equity premium puzzle. A common way
of measuring the equity premium is to take the ratio of the mean excess return in a
finite sample of time series data and divide it by the volatility of the risky rate. That
statistic is known as the Sharpe ratio.
Part of the problem faced by representative agents models when confronting asset
market data is the inability of those models to generate a sufficiently volatile pricing
kernel (Cochrane, 2011). Since our model does not suffer from this defect, it is
plausible that our work could offer a more satisfactory explanation of the equity
premium. When sunspots are uncorrelated with fundamentals and preferences are
logarithmic, our model does not deliver a large equity premium in infinite samples.
However, we show that discount rate volatility is so large in our model that there is
a significant probability of observing a high Sharpe ratio.
To make these points we show, first, using a local approximation argument, that
sunspot volatility does not affect the asymptotic value of the equity premium when
sunspots are uncorrelated with fundamentals. Then we compute the invariant distri-
bution of the safe and risky returns for a calibrated example, and we compute the
Sharpe ratio in 10, 000 draws of 60 years of data. We show, in our calibrated example,
that there is 12% probability of observing a Sharpe ratio of at least 0.2
To construct a local approximation, we first provide a model of consumption growth
as a first order autocorrelated process,
(63) log γt+1 = η log γt + (1− η) log µγ + log εf,t.
Here, η is an autocorrelation parameter and log εf,t is a fundamental, normally dis-
tributed i.i.d. shock,
(64) log εf,t ∼ N
(
−σ
2
f
2
, σ2f
)
,
3The proof, which is available upon request, is based on various Definitions and Theorems provided
in Futia (1982) (see Theorem 4.6, Proposition 4.4, Definition 2.1, Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 2.9).
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with E(εf,t) = 1. These assumptions imply that the unconditional distribution of γt
is log-normal with mean mγ and variance σ2γ, where
4
mγ = log µγ −
σ2f
2(1− η) ,(65)
σ2γ =
σ2f
1− η2 .(66)
From the properties of the log-normal distribution we also have that,
(67) E (γt) = µγe−
ησ2γ
2 .
To describe extrinsic uncertainty, we assume that εs,t is a log normal random vari-
able, with mean −σ2s/2 and variance σ2s :
(68) log εs,t ∼ N
(−σ2s
2
, σ2s
)
,
so that E [εs,t] = 1. Although this process is not bounded, by making the variance
of εs,t small we can make the probability that εs,t lies in a bounded interval arbitrar-
ily close to 1. In the following analysis we assume that εf,t and εs,t are log-normal
and we use this assumption to derive approximations to the value of the equity pre-
mium. We also assume here that the log-normal distributions of these two shocks are
independent.
To get an approximation to the importance of extrinsic volatility, we log linearize
Equation (59) around the non-stochastic steady state, Q˜∗. The following lemma
derives a log-normal approximation to the distribution of Q˜t+1t that is valid for small
noise.
Lemma 2. The stochastic process described by Equation (59) has the following ap-
proximate representation
(69) log Q˜t+1t = χ log Q˜
t
t−1 + (1− χ) log Q˜∗ + η1 log εs,t+1 + η2 log εs,t +O
(
x2
)
,
4Using Equations (63) and (64), it follows that
E (log γt) = logµγ +
E(log εf,t)
1− η = logµγ −
σ2f
2(1− η) ≡ mγ ,
and
V ar (log γt) =
V ar(log εf,t)
1− η2 =
σ2f
1− η2 ≡ σ
2
γ .
Further, log γt is normally distributed,
log γt ∼ N
(
mγ , σ
2
γ
)
,
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where
(70) χ =
(1−B1)(1−B2)
pi(Q˜∗)2
,
and η1 and η2 are computed as the logarithmic derivatives with respect to εs,t+1 and
εs,t of the function h in Equation (59) evaluated at its non-stochastic steady state,
Q˜∗. The approximation error is O (x2) where x is the difference of log Q˜Tt−1 from
log Q˜∗. It follows from the linearity of (69), that Q˜t+1t is approximately log-normal
with unconditional mean
(71) E
[
Q˜t+1t
]
= Q˜∗ exp
(
σ2
Q˜
2
[
1− (1 + χ)
(
η1 + η2
η21 + η
2
2
)])
,
or equivalently
(72) log Q˜t+1t ∼ N
(
mQ˜, σ
2
Q˜
)
.
where
(73) mQ˜ ≡ log Q˜∗ −
(η1 + η2)σ
2
s
2(1− χ) ,
and
(74) σ2
Q˜
≡ (η
2
1 + η
2
2)σ
2
s
1− χ2 .
Proof. See Appendix F. 
Next, we use Lemma 2 to derive approximate formulae for the price of a riskless
and a risky security. Consider first, a riskless bond that pays a gross return Rt+1,St in
every state. Here we use the superscript S to denote ‘safe’. Using the no arbitrage
assumption, the return to this riskless asset is given by the expression,
(75) Rt+1,St =
1∑
S′ Q
t+1
t
.
Now consider a risky security that pays νωt at date t where ν is a real number
between zero and one. This is the model analog of equity since it represents a claim
to a fraction of the risky endowment stream. If this security sells for price qt then the
risky return between periods t and t+ 1, Rt+1,Rt , is given by the expression,
(76) Rt+1,Rt =
qt+1 + νωt+1
qt
,
where the superscript R denotes ‘risky’. We may then compute approximations to
the safe return, the return to a risky security and the equity premium.
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Proposition 5. Let
(77) Rt+1,St =
1
Et
[
Q˜t+1t γ
−1
t+1
]
be the return to a risk free real bond and let qt be the price of a security that pays a
fraction ν of the endowment ωt in all future states. Let
(78) Rt+1,Rt =
qt+1 + νωt+1
qt
,
be the return to this risky security. Assume further that intrinsic and extrinsic un-
certainty are uncorrelated,
(79) Cov (εs,t+i, εf,t+j) = 0, for all i, j.
Then i) the safe return is given by the approximation
(80) RS ' µγ
Q˜∗
e−
σ2γ (2+η)
2
−
σ2
Q˜
"
1−(1+χ)
 
η1+η2
η21+η
2
2
!#
2 ,
ii) The risky return is given by the approximation
(81) RR ' µγ
Q˜∗
e
−ησ2γ
2
−
σ2
Q˜
"
1−(1+χ)
 
η1+η2
η21+η
2
2
!#
2 ,
iii) The equity premium is given by the expression
(82)
RR
RS
' eσ2γ .
Proof. See Appendix G. 
Proposition 5 establishes that, in the case where sunspot uncertainty is uncorrelated
with fundamental uncertainty, the variance of the sunspot term does not enter the
expression for the equity premium. Sunspot uncertainty adds noise to the risky return,
but it does not explain why a risky security should pay systematically more than a
safe bond.
What if sunspots are correlated with consumption growth? Here there is some hope
that sunspots may contribute to an explanation of the equity premium. To illustrate
this point, we solved the full non-linear model for a series of calibrated examples. The
following section reports the result of this exercise.
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VII. Simulating the invariant distribution
To compute moments of the invariant distribution, we used the difference equation
(57), to construct an approximation to the transition function
(83) T (x,A) ,
where x ≡ {z, γ} is the value of the state at date t and A is a set that represents
possible values that z and γ might take at date t + 1. For every value of A, T (·, A)
is a measurable function and for every value of x, T (x, ·) is a probability measure
(Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, 1989, Chaper 8). If p (x) is the probability that the
system is in state x at date t then
(84) p′ (x′) =
∫
X
T (x, x′) dp (x) ,
is the probability that it is in state x′ at date t + 1. By iterating on this operator
equation for arbitrary initial p we arrive at an expression for the invariant measure.
This invariant measure, p (x), is the unconditional probability of observing the system
in state x = {z, γ}. We now explain how to compute a discrete approximation to this
invariant measure.
Let Z be the set Z ≡ [z1, zb] and define Γ = [γ1, γ2] as the set inhabited by γt when
γ is generated by Equation (63) and εf,t ∈ . We divided Z and Γ into nz and nγ,
equally spaced intervals and we approximated the operator T with a matrix T˜ by
breaking the state space into nz×nγ intervals. In practice, we found that nz = 30 and
nγ = 10 leads to a fine enough approximation to give good results while remaining
computationally manageable.
We need to compute state transition matrices that are n2 × n2 where n = nz × nγ.
For nz = 30 and nγ = 10, n = 300 and n2 = 90, 000. For these values, our code
takes approximately 5 seconds in Matlab on an Apple Mac with dual 2.13 GHZ Intel
processors.
To compute the invariant distribution in a parameterized example, we used values of
pi = 0.98, µ = 0.5, β1 = 0.98, β2 = 0.9 and we set the autocorrelation parameter γ = 0,
and the standard deviation of the shocks at σf = 0.05 and σs = 0.06. We partitioned
the space X = Z ×Γ into 300 cells and for each pair of cells, {k = {i, j} , l = {i′, j′}}
we computed the pair of shocks, {εf,k,l, εs,k,l} needed to get from the midpoint of cell
k = {i, j} to the midpoint of cell l = {i′, j′}. Here i and i′, are elements of Z and j
and j′ are elements of Γ. This process generated a grid, 300× 300 and 90, 000 pairs
of numbers εk,l = {εf,k,l, εs,k,l} associated with each cell of the grid.
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To compute the probability of any pair of numbers εk,l = {εf,k,l, εs,k,l} we used a
discrete approximation to a normal distribution. First we associated a weight
(85) wk,l = exp
(− (εk,l − a) Σ−1 (εk,l − a)) ,
with each value of εk,l = {εf,k,l, εs,k,l} . Here
(86) Σ =
[
σ2s σsf
σfs σ
2
f
]
,
is the variance covariance matrix of the shocks and a = [af ; as] is a vector of centrality
parameters.
In our baseline case we set σsf = 0 but we also experimented with the correlated
case by choosing values of the correlation coefficient,
(87) ρ =
σsf
σsσf
,
between −0.95 and +0.95.
To compute a discrete approximation to the operator T we constructed a Markov
matrix T˜ by normalizing the weights wk,l. This process led to a set of n discrete
probability measures pk,l, where
(88) pk,l =
wk,l∑
l wk,l
,
is one row of the Markov matrix
(89) T˜ =
[
T˜k,l
]
.
Next, we used Newton’s method to adjust the centrality parameters, a, to ensure
that, for each k,
(90) fk (a) =
∑
l
pk,l (a)
[
εs,k,l
εf,k,l
]
−
[
1
1
]
= 0.
This step ensures that the discrete probability measures pk for each k are consistent
with the assumptions that E [εs] = 1 and E [εf ] = 1. Figure 3 illustrates the invariant
joint distribution over γ and z that we computed using this method.
We can also compute the marginal distribution of human wealth which we report in
Figure 4. The median human wealth ratio is a little over 20, but there is considerable
probability mass that this ratio will be less than 18 or greater than 23. That difference
represents twenty five percent of the median human wealth. If we define a recession
to be a value of the human wealth ratio less than 18 and a boom, a ratio greater
than 23, then a person of either type who is born into a recession will have lifetime
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Figure 3. The joint invariant distribution of consumption growth and
the human wealth ratio
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Figure 4. The marginal invariant distribution of the human wealth ratio
wealth that is approximately twenty five percent lower than a similar person born in
a boom. These are big numbers.
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VII.1. The equity premium in simulated data. Since the equity premium can
always be increased by leverage, a better measure of excess returns is the Sharpe
ratio; this is the ratio of the excess return of a risky to a safe security, divided by the
standard deviation of the risky security. In U.S. data, the Sharpe ratio has historically
been in the range of 0.25 to 0.5, depending on the sample length and the frequency
of observation.
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Figure 5. The Sharpe ratio and the correlation coefficient
To explore the role of correlated shocks in determining the Sharpe ratio, we com-
puted the invariant distribution for a sequence of economies in which the shocks to
growth, εf were correlated with extrinsic uncertainty, εs. For each case, we held the
parameters of the model constant at the same values used to construct Figure 3, but
we allowed the correlation coefficient, ρ, between intrinsic and extrinsic shocks to
vary from −.095 to +0.95. The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 5 which
shows that the value of the Sharpe ratio in the invariant distribution varies from
−0.03, when ρ = −0.95 to +0.03, when ρ = +0.95. These numbers do not depend on
a local approximation, they are computed using a grid approximation to the entire
invariant distribution.
The Sharpe ratio increases as the correlation coefficient increases because a risky
security becomes less attractive to hold if its payoff is correlated with consumption.
In a representative agent model, consumption and the endowment are the same thing.
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Figure 4 shows that the same logic holds in the two agent economy where the con-
sumption of the agent holding the risky security is not perfectly correlated with GDP.
But although the model can generate a positive Sharpe ratio, the largest value
in our calibrated economy is closer to 0.03 than to 0.5, the value observed in U.S.
data. Theoretically, one could make the value of the Sharpe ratio arbitrarily large
by increasing the volatility of the sunspot shock. But there is an upper bound on
sunspot volatility determined by the difference between the time preference rate of
the patient and impatient individuals. This difference determines the range of feasible
values of zt which, in turn, determines a bound on the volatility of εs.
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Figure 6. The empirical distribution of Sharpe ratios
Although the theoretical value of the Sharpe ratio is small, the high volatility of
equity returns implies that there is a significant probability of observing a high Sharpe
ratio in any given sample. To explore the possibility that a high Sharpe ratio is an
artifact of sampling variation, we simulated 10, 000 samples of length 60. Figure 6
reports the result of that exercise.
We calibrated the model parameters to annual data so each sample represents an
observation of 60 years of data. The figure reports the empirical frequency distribution
of Sharpe ratios across these 10, 000 samples and it is clear from the figure that there
is a high probability of observing a Sharpe ratio greater than 0.2. In the empirical
distribution, 33% of the observed Sharpe ratios were greater than 0.1, 21% were
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greater than 0.15 and 12% were 0.2 or larger. There is however, almost no probability
of observing a Sharpe ratio of 0.5. In our experiment, only 6 out of 10, 000 draws
were greater than 0.5.5
To give some idea of the time series properties of data generated by our model,
Figure 7 reports the values of six time series for a single draw of 60 years of data.
The sequence of sunspot shocks used for this simulation were uncorrelated, implying
that the theoretical value of the Sharpe ratio is around 1% (see Figure 5). The draw
used for this simulation has a Sharpe ratio of 0.24.
The two top left panels of Figure 7 show that the risky return is much more volatile
than the safe return and, for this particular draw, the risky return has a higher mean.
The bottom left panel illustrates aggregate consumption growth which varies by a
little more than plus or minus 4% and has a standard deviation of 0.03, which matches
the volatility of consumption growth in post-war U.S. data.
The top two panels on the right of the figure illustrate the share of consumption
going to type 1 agents, and the value of the pricing kernel. These panels show that
even though aggregate consumption growth is relatively smooth, the consumption
growth of type 1 agents can vary by as much as 30% over the business cycle. It is the
volatility of individual consumption growth rates that allows this model to generate
a volatile pricing kernel.6
The bottom right panel shows what’s happening to the price-earnings ratio which
takes long slow swings varying over a range from 30 to 40. Although this range is
smaller than observed price earnings ratios in U.S. data, which vary from 10 to 45,
our price earning statistic does not allow for leverage which is both high and variable
in the data.
5Remember, however, that we are maintaining the assumption of logarithmic preferences and
we conjecture that by relaxing that assumption and allowing for constant relative risk aversion
preferences, we will multiply the range of observed Sharpe ratios by a factor proportional to the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. That exercise is feasible using the results we report in Farmer,
Nourry, and Venditti (2011), but the exercise of computing the invariant distribution is significantly
more complicated since it involves solving for an additional functional equation. We explore that
extension in work in progress.
6Although 30% is high relative to aggregate consumption volatility, there is evidence that high
income individuals who own stock have consumption growth that is four times as volatile as average
consumption growth (Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2009).
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Figure 7. Six time series generated by simulating sixty years of data
VIII. Conclusion
The first welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory asserts that every compet-
itive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. When financial markets are complete, and when
all agents are able to participate in financial markets, this theorem implies that un-
restricted trade in financial assets will lead to the efficient allocation of risk to those
who are best able to bear it.
We have shown, in this paper, that unregulated financial markets do not lead to
Pareto efficient outcomes and that the failure of complete financial markets to deliver
socially efficient allocations has nothing to do with financial constraints, transactions
costs or artificial barriers to trade. The first welfare theorem fails because participa-
tion in financial markets is necessarily incomplete as a consequence of the fact that
agents cannot trade risk in financial markets that open before they are born. For this
reason, financial markets do not work well in the real world.
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The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model (Ramsey, 1928; Koopmans, 1965; Cass, 1965)
underpins not only all of modern macroeconomics, but also all of modern finance
theory. Existing literature modifies this model by adding frictions of one kind or
another to explain why free trade in competitive markets cannot achieve an efficient
allocation of risk. It has not, as yet, offered a convincing explanation for the volatility
of the stochastic discount factor in real world data. The most surprising feature of
our work is how close it is to the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model; yet we do not need
to assume frictions of any kind. We have shown that financial markets cannot be
Pareto efficient, except by chance. Although individuals, in our model, are rational;
markets are not.
THE INEFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS 31
Appendix
Appendix A.
Proof of Proposition 1. If we sum Equation (23) over all agents of type i who were
alive at date t, we arrive at the equation,
(A.1) Qt+1t
(
St+1
)
=
ψ (St+1) βi
∑
j∈At c
j
i,t (S
t)∑
j∈At c
j
i,t+1 (S
t+1)
.
The consumption at date t+ 1 of everyone of type i who was alive at date t, is equal
to the consumption of all agents of type i minus the consumption of the new borns.
For any date t+ 1 and any variable x let xjt be the quantity of that variable held by a
household of generation j and let xt be the aggregate quantity. Let At be the index
set of all agents alive at date t and let Nt+1 denote the set of newborns at period
t+ 1. Then,
(A.2) pi
∑
j∈At
xjt+1 +
∑
j∈Nt+1
xjt+1 =
∑
j∈At+1
xjt+1 = xt+1.
Using Equation (A.2) we can write the denominator of Equation (A.1) as,
(A.3)
∑
j∈At
cji,t+1
(
St+1
)
=
1
pi
 ∑
j∈At+1
cji,t+1
(
St+1
)− ∑
j∈Nt+1
cji,t+1
(
St+1
) .
The first term on the right-hand-side of this equation is aggregate consumption of
type i, which we define as
(A.4) ci,t+1
(
St+1
) ≡ ∑
j∈At+1
cji,t+1
(
St+1
)
.
The second term is the consumption of the newborns of type i. Because these agents
are born with no financial assets, their consumption is proportional to their human
wealth. This leads to the expression
(A.5)
∑
j∈Nt+1
cji,t+1
(
St+1
)
= Bi (1− pi)hi,t+1
(
St+1
)
,
where the coefficient (1− pi) , is the fraction of newborns of type i. Using equations
(A.3)-(A.5) we can rewrite (A.1) as
(A.6) Qt+1t
(
St+1
)
=
ψ (St+1) (1−Bi) ci,t (St)
ci,t+1 (St+1)−Bi (1− pi)hi,t+1 (St+1) ,
which is Equation (28), the expression we seek. 
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Appendix B.
Proof of Lemma 1. From Equation(29), evaluated for types 1 and 2, we get
(B.1) αt =
λt
B1
− z1,t,
(B.2) −αt = 1− λt
B2
− z2,t.
Summing (B.1) and (B.2) and rearranging leads to Equation (35). The fact that ζ is
increasing in z follows from the assumption, B2 > B1. The domain of ζ is found by
evaluating ζ−1 for values of λ = 0 and λ = 1.
From (35) we have that,
(B.3) λt =
B1B2
B2 −B1
(
zt − 1
B2
)
,
which expresses the consumption share as a function of the aggregate human wealth
ratio. From the consumption function of type 1 agents, Equation (29), we have the
following expression linking the consumption share with the asset share, and with the
type 1 human wealth ratio,
(B.4) λt = B1 (αt + z1,t) .
Combing equations (B.3) and (B.4) gives
(B.5) B1 (αt + z1,t) =
B1B2
B2 −B1
(
zt − 1
B2
)
.
Using definition, (36), this leads to Equation (37), the expression we seek. 
Appendix C.
Proof of Proposition 2. From Proposition 1 and the restriction to perfect foresight
equilibria, we have that
(C.1) λt =
B1B2
B2 −B1
(
zt − 1
B2
)
.
Leading Equation (C.1) one period gives,
(C.2) λt+1 =
B1B2
B2 −B1
(
zt+1 − 1
B2
)
.
Dividing the numerator of Equation (28), by ωt and dividing the denominator by
ωt+1 leads to the following expressions that relate the normalized pricing kernel to
the consumption share and to the human wealth ratio of each type,
(C.3) Q˜t+1t =
(1−B1)λt
λt+1 −B1 (1− pi) z1,t+1 ,
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(C.4) Q˜t+1t =
(1−B2) (1− λt)
1− λt+1 −B2 (1− pi) z2,t+1 .
These expressions follow from the fact that agents of each type equate the marginal
rate of substitution to the pricing kernel, state by state.
Next, we divide the human wealth equation, (24), by the aggregate endowment.
That leads to the following difference equation in the human wealth ratio for type i,
(C.5) zi,t = µi + piEt
[
Q˜t+1t zi,t+1
]
.
Adding up Equation (C.5) over both types leads to the following expression for the
aggregate human wealth ratio,
(C.6) zt = 1 + piEt
[
Q˜t+1t zt+1
]
.
Substituting for λt and λt+1 from equations (C.1) and (C.2) into (C.4), we obtain
the following expression for z2,t+1 as a function of zt and z1,t+17
(C.7) z2,t+1 = −(piB1 −B1 − piB1B2) ztz1,t+1 + zt + (B1 − pi + piB2) z1,t+1 − 1
(piB2 −B2 − piB1B2) zt + (B2 + pi (B1 − 1)) .
Define the following transformed parameters
(C.8)
θ1 = B2 − pi(1−B1) + µ(1− pi)(B1 −B2),
θ2 = −B2(1− pi)− piB1B2 < 0,
θ3 = (B2 −B1)(1− pi),
θ4 = B2 − pi (1−B1) = θ1 + µθ3.
Combining equation (C.1)–(C.3) with (C.4) using (C.7) and (C.8) gives the following
expression for the normalized pricing kernel,
(C.9) piQ˜t+1t = −
θ1 + µθ3 + θ2zt
1 + θ3z1,t+1
= − θ4 + θ2zt
1 + θ3z1,t+1
.
Because we have normalized all variables by income, none of the equations of our
model contain random variables. Hence we may drop the expectations operator and
write the human wealth equations, (C.5) and (C.6) as follows,
(C.10) z1,t = µ+ piQ˜t+1t z1,t+1,
(C.11) zt = 1 + piQ˜t+1t zt+1.
Rearranging Equations (C.10) and (C.11), replacing Q˜t+1t from (C.9), gives,
(C.12) z1,t+1 =
µ− z1,t
θ1 + θ2zt + θ3z1,t
,
7The algebra used to derive (C.7) was checked using Maple in Scientific Workplace. The code is
available from the authors on request.
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(C.13) zt+1 =
1− zt
θ1 + θ2zt + θ3z1,t
,
which are the expressions for equations (39) and (40) that we seek. The initial condi-
tion, Equation (41), follows from Proposition 1 and the expression for the normalized
pricing kernel. 
Appendix D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Evaluating equations (C.12) and (C.13) at a steady state, it
follows that a steady state equilibrium is a solution of the following second degree
polynomial
(D.1) P(z) = z2(θ2 + µθ3) + z(1 + θ1)− 1 = 0.
Define the discriminant
(D.2) ∆ = (1 + θ1)2 + 4(θ2 + µθ3).
Using the fact that B2 > B1, it follows from the definitions of θ1, θ2 and θ3 that
θ1 > B2 − pi(1 − B1), θ3 > 0 and hence θ2 + µθ3 > θ2. Using these inequalities to
replace (θ2 + µθ3) by θ2 and replacing θ2 by its definition, it follows that
(D.3) ∆ > [B2 + 1− pi(1−B1)]2 − 4B2[1− pi(1−B1)] = [B2 − 1 + pi(1−B1)]2 ≥ 0.
Since the discriminant is non-negative, there exist two real solutions to Equation
(D.1), z∗ and z∗∗, given by the expressions,
(D.4) z∗ = −1 + θ1 +
√
∆
2(θ2 + µθ3)
> z∗∗ = −1 + θ1 −
√
∆
2(θ2 + µθ3)
.
We next need to check that these two solutions belong to the admissible set (za, zb).
Consider first the lower solution z∗∗. From the definition of z∗∗ it follows that z∗∗ >
za ≡ 1/B2 if and only if
(D.5) 1 + θ1 +
2(θ2 + µθ3)
B2
<
√
∆.
Squaring both sides of (D.5) and substituting for ∆ from (D.2) implies that, equiva-
lently,
(D.6) 1 + θ1 −B2 + θ2 + µθ3
B2
< 0.
Substituting the expressions for θ1, θ2 and θ3 into this inequality and rearranging
terms leads to the following expression for the left-hand side of (D.6),
(D.7) µ(1− pi)(B2 −B1)1−B2
B2
> 0,
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where the inequality in (D.7) follows since 1 > B2 > B1 > 0 and pi < 1. It follows
that z∗∗ < za and hence z∗∗ is not an admissible steady state.
Consider now the larger of the two solutions, z∗. The same computation as previ-
ously allows us to conclude that z∗ > za. We must next show that z∗ < zb ≡ 1/B1.
Using the definition of z∗, this occurs if and only if
(D.8) 1 + θ1 +
2(θ2 + µθ3)
B1
< −
√
∆.
A necessary condition for this inequality to hold is that the left-hand side is negative.
Using the definitions of θ1, θ2 and θ3, we may write the left side of (D.8) as the
following second degree polynomial in B1,
G(B1) = B1 [1 +B2 − pi(1−B1) + µ(1− pi)(B1 −B2)]
−2 [B2(1− pi) + piB1B2 + µ(1− pi)(B1 −B2)] < 0.(D.9)
Notice that G(B1) is convex for B1 ∈ (0, B2). Further, we have that that G(0) = 0
and G(B2) = −B2(1−pi)(1−B2) < 0. It follows that for any B1 ∈ (0, B2), G(B1) < 0
and thus the left-hand side of (D.8) is negative. It follows that inequality (D.8) holds
if
(D.10) 1 + θ1 −B1 + θ2 + µθ3
B1
< 0.
Substituting the expressions for θ1, θ2 and θ3 into this inequality and simplifying the
expression yields
(D.11) −(1− pi)(1− µ)(1−B1)(B2 −B1) < 0.
This inequality establishes that z∗ ∈ Zˆ and hence z∗ is an admissible steady state.
We study the stability properties of z∗by linearizing the dynamical system (39)–(40)
around z∗. Using the steady state relationships (46) and (47), we get after some
simplification, the following Jacobian matrix
(D.12) J =
(
z∗−1
z∗ (1 + θ2z
∗) (z∗ − 1)θ3
(z∗ − 1)µθ2 z∗−1z∗ (1 + µθ3z∗)
)
.
The associated characteristic polynomial is[
z∗ − 1
z∗
(1 + θ2z
∗)− x
] [
z∗ − 1
z∗
(1 + µθ3z
∗)− x
]
− (z∗ − 1)2µθ2θ3,
=
(
x− z
∗
z∗ − 1
)(
x− 1− θ1z
∗
z∗ − 1
)
= 0,(D.13)
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with characteristic roots
x1 =
z∗
z∗ − 1 > 1,(D.14a)
x2 =
1− θ1z∗
z∗ − 1 .(D.14b)
Notice that the dynamical system (39) and (40) admits z1,t = µzt for all t as a
solution. It follows that the two-dimensional dynamical system in (zt, z1,t) can be
reduced to the one-dimensional difference equation defined by Equation (49). We
next establish that this system is a saddle and that the one-dimensional difference
equation (49) is globally stable. Since, from (D.14a), x1 is positive and greater than
one, we need only establish a general property to guarantee global conclusion and
that −1 < x2 < 1. Let us first consider the derivative of g(z) for any z, g′(z) =
(1− θ1z)/(z − 1). Since z > 1, we have g′(z) ≥ −1 for any z ∈ (za, zb) if 1− θ1 ≥ 0,
which holds since B2 > B1. This property implies that x2 > −1. Moreover, we get
g′(za) > 0 if and only if B2−θ1 > 0, which again holds as B2 > B1. We then establish
that x2 < 1. From (D.14b), this follows if and only if 2− (1 + θ1)z∗ < 0. Equivalently
using the definitions of θ1 and z∗, together with the fact that θ2 + µθ3 < 0, x2 < 1, if
and only if
4(θ2 + µθ3) + (1 + θ1)
[
1 + θ1 +
√
∆
]
= ∆ + (1 + θ1)
√
∆
=
√
∆
[
1 + θ1 +
√
∆
]
> 0.(D.15)
We derive from (C.8) that
(D.16) 1 + θ1 = B2 [1− µ(1− pi)] +B1µ(1− pi) + 1− pi(1−B1) > 0,
and thus x2 < 1. Since x1 > 1 we conclude that z∗ is saddle-point stable. Further, z∗
is globally stable for any zt ∈ Zˆ.
Next we turn to an equivalent representation of the system using Q˜t+1t as a state
variable. Replacing z1,t+1 from (39) in Equation (43), and simplifying the resulting
expression gives,
(D.17) Q˜t+1t = −
θ1 + θ2zt + θ3z1,t
pi
.
Substituting the restriction z1,t = µzt into Equation (D.17) and inverting the equation
to find zt as a function of Q˜t+1t , leads to
(D.18) zt = −piQ˜
t+1
t + θ1
θ2 + µθ3
.
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Substituting this expression into (49) and rearranging terms leads to the difference
equation
(D.19) Q˜t+2t+1 = h
(
Q˜t+1t
)
,
where
(D.20) h
(
Q˜t+1t
)
≡ 1− θ1
pi
+
θ1 + θ2 + µθ3
pi2Q˜t+1t
=
1− θ1
pi
− (1−B1)(1−B2)
piQ˜t+1t
,
which provides an equivalent representation of the equilibrium in terms of Q˜. Using
the same arguments as previously, it follows that for all Q10 ∈ (qa, qb) with
(D.21) qa = −θ1 + (θ2 + µθ3) za
pi
, qb = −θ1 + (θ2 + µθ3) zb
pi
.
there exists a sequence of equilibrium asset prices described by the difference equation
(D.19), that converges to the steady state pricing kernel. 
Appendix E.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the definition of human wealth,
(E.1) zt = 1 + Et
[
piQ˜t+1t zt+1
]
.
In Proposition 2, Equation (C.9), we derived an expression for the pricing kernel
Q˜t+1t (zt, z1,t+1), that we write below as Equation (E.2).
(E.2) piQ˜t+1t = −
(
θ4 + θ2zt
1 + θ3z1,t+1
)
.
Replacing (E.2) in (E.1), and restricting attention to the stable branch of the saddle
by setting z1,t = µzt, we arrive at a the following functional equation,
(E.3) zt = 1 + Et
[
−
(
θ4 + θ2zt
1 + µθ3zt+1
)
zt+1
]
.
Since Equation (E.3) characterizes equilibria, it follows that any admissible sequence
{zt} that satisfies Equation (E.3) is an equilibrium sequence. We now show how to
construct a stochastic process for {zt} that generates admissible solutions to (E.3).
Let εs,t+1, be a bounded, i.i.d. random variable with support  ≡ [ea, eb] such that
(E.4) Et (εs,t+1) = 1,
and consider sequences for {zt}, z ∈ Z ≡ (z1, zb) that satisfy the equation,
(E.5) (zt − 1) εs,t+1 = −
(
θ4 + θ2zt
1 + θ3µzt+1
)
zt+1.
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Rearranging (E.5), using the fact that θ4 − µθ3 = θ1, we may define a function
g (·) : Z × → Z,
(E.6) zt+1 =
(1− zt) εs,t+1
(θ4 − µθ3εs,t+1) + (θ2 + µθ3εs,t+1) zt = g (zt, εs,t+1) .
This is the analog of Equation (49) in Proposition 3. Any admissible sequence must
lie in the set Zˆ ≡ [za, zb] where za ≡ B−12 and zb ≡ B−11 . We now show how to
construct the largest set Z ⊂ Zˆ such that all sequences {zt} generated by (E.6) are
admissible. Note first, that
(E.7)
∂g(z, εs)
∂εs
=
(1− z) (θ4 + θ2z)
[(θ4 − µθ3εs) + (θ2 + µθ3εs) z]2
,
where θ4+θ2za = B2(1−za) < 0 and θ4+θ2zb = (1−zb)[piB1+B2(1−pi)] < 0. Because
z > 1, it follows that ∂g(z, εs)/∂εs > 0 for any z ∈ (za, zb). Moreover, g(1, εs) = 0 for
any εs. We conclude that the graph of the function g(z, εs) rotates counter-clockwise
around z = 1 as εs increases. The upper bound εb is then obtained as the solution of
the equation, zb = g (zb, εs). A straightforward computation yields
(E.8) εb =
zb(θ4 + θ2zb)
(1− zb)(1 + µθ3zb) .
Starting from the upper bound εb, εs can be decreased down to the point where
the graph of the function g(z, εs) becomes tangent with the 45◦ line. Consider the
equation g(z, εs) = z which can be rearranged to give the equivalent second degree
polynomial
(E.9) z2(θ2 + µθ3ε) + z[θ4 + ε(1− µθ3)]− ε = 0.
We denote by z1, the value of z for which the two roots of (E.9) are equal and hence
the discriminant of (E.9) is equal to zero. Equation (E.10) defines a polynomial in εs
such that this discriminant condition is satisfied and εa is the larger of the two values
of εs such that this condition holds;
(E.10)
[θ4 + ε(1− µθ3)]2 + 4ε(θ2 + µθ3ε) = 0,
⇔ ε2(1 + µθ3)2 + 2ε[θ4(1− µθ3) + 2θ2] + θ24 = 0.
Using the formula for the roots of a quadratic, we obtain the following explicit ex-
pression for εa;
(E.11) εa =
−[θ4(1− µθ3) + 2θ2] +
√
[θ4(1− µθ3) + 2θ2]2 − θ24(1 + µθ3)2
(1 + µθ3)2
.
This establishes the first part of Proposition 4.
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We now derive an equivalent difference equation in Q˜t+1t . Here we use (E.2) and
(E.3) to give the following expression for Q˜t+1t ,
(E.12) Q˜t+1t =
− (θ4 − µθ3εs,t+1)− (θ2 + µθ3εs,t+1) zt
pi
.
Rearranging (E.12) gives,
(E.13) zt = −(θ4 − µθ3εs,t+1)
(θ2 + µθ3εs,t+1)
− piQ˜
t+1
t
(θ2 + µθ3εs,t+1)
.
Substitute (E.12) into (E.13) to give
(E.14) Q˜t+1t = a (εs,t, εs,t+1) +
b (εs,t, εs,t+1)
Q˜tt−1
≡ h
(
Q˜tt−1, εs,t+1, εs,t
)
,
where, using the fact that θ1 + θ2 + µθ3 ≡ θ2 + θ4, we define,
(E.15) a (εs,t, εs,t+1) ≡ 1
pi
{
εs,t (θ2 + µθ3εs,t+1)
(θ2 + µθ3εs,t)
− θ4 − µθ3εs,t+1
}
,
(E.16) b (εs,t, εs,t+1) =
1
pi2
{
εs,t (θ2 + θ4) (θ2 + µθ3εs,t+1)
(θ2 + µθ3εs,t)
}
.
Equation (E.14) is the analog of Equation (51). This establishes the second part of
Proposition 4. 
Appendix F.
Proof of Lemma 2. Taking logs of Equation (59), using the equations (60)–(62), leads
to the equivalent expression
(F.1)
log Q˜t+1t (S
′) = log 1
pi
{
elog εs,t(θ2+µθ3elog εs,t+1)
(θ2+µθ3elog εs,t)
− θ4 + µθ3elog εs,t+1
+ 1
pi2
{
elog εs,t (θ2+θ4)(θ2+µθ3elog εs,t+1)
(θ2+µθ3elog εs,t)
}
1
e
log Q˜tt−1(S)
}
Log-linearizing this expression gives
(F.2)
log Q˜t+1t (S
′) = log Q˜∗ + ∂ log Q˜
t+1
t (S
′)
∂ log Q˜tt−1(S)
∣∣∣
Q˜
[
log Q˜tt−1(S)− log Q˜∗
]
+
∂ log Q˜t+1t (S
′)
∂ log εs,t+1
∣∣∣
Q˜
log εs,t+1 +
∂ log Q˜t+1t (S
′)
∂ log εs,t
∣∣∣
Q˜
log εs,t,
with
(F.3)
∂ log Q˜t+1t (S
′)
∂ log Q˜tt−1(S)
∣∣∣
Q˜
= − b(1,1)
(Q˜∗)2 = − θ2+θ4pi2(Q˜∗)2 =
(1−B1)(1−B2)
pi(Q˜∗)2 ≡ χ,
∂ log Q˜t+1t (S
′)
∂ log εs,t+1
∣∣∣
Q˜
= µθ3
θ2+µθ3
1+θ2+µθ3+
θ1+θ2+µθ3
piQ˜∗
1−θ1+ θ1+θ2+µθ3piQ˜∗
≡ η1,
∂ log Q˜t+1t (S
′)
∂ log εs,t+1
∣∣∣
Q˜
= θ2
θ2+µθ3
1+
θ1+θ2+µθ3
piQ˜∗
1−θ1+ θ1+θ2+µθ3piQ˜∗
≡ η2.
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It follows that
(F.4) log Q˜t+1t = χ log Q˜
t
t−1 + (1− χ) log Q˜∗ + η1 log εs,t+1 + η2 log εs,t.
Let us first compute the unconditional expectation of log Q˜t+1t . From equation (F.4)
we get
(F.5) E(log Q˜t+1t ) = log Q˜
∗ +
(η1 + η2)E(log εs,t)
1− χ .
Since we have assumed that
(F.6) log εs,t ∼ N
(−σ2s
2
, σ2s
)
,
we derive
(F.7) E(log Q˜t+1t ) = log Q˜
∗ − (η1 + η2)σ
2
s
2(1− χ) .
Let us now compute the unconditional variance of log Q˜t+1t . From equation (F.4) we
get
(F.8) V ar(log Q˜t+1t ) =
(η21 + η
2
2)V ar(log εs,t)
1− χ2 =
(η21 + η
2
2)σ
2
s
1− χ2 ≡ σ
2
Q˜
.
From the properties of the log-normal distribution, we then have that
(F.9) log Q˜t+1t ∼ N
(
log Q˜∗ − (η1+η2)σ2s
2(1−χ) ,
(η21+η
2
2)σ
2
s
1−χ2
)
,
and the unconditional mean of Q˜t+1t is
(F.10) E
[
Q˜t+1t
]
= Q˜∗ exp
(
σ2
Q˜
2
[
1− (1 + χ)
(
η1 + η2
η21 + η
2
2
)])
.

Appendix G.
Proof of Proposition 5. From equations (1) and (75), we get the following expression
for the gross safe real rate of return, RS,
(G.1) RS =
1∑
S′ Q
t+1
t
=
1
Et
[
Q˜t+1t γ
−1
t+1
] .
The safe rate of return is a random variable because income growth is autocorrelated
and governed by Equation (63) and also because now the pricing kernel is subject to
sunspot shocks. Assuming that intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty are uncorrelated,
(G.2) Cov (εs,t+i, εf,t+j) = 0, for all i, j.
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we derive that the unconditional mean of the safe return is
(G.3) RS =
1
E
[
Q˜t+1t
]
E
[
γ−1t+1
] .
Using the properties of the log-normal distribution, we derive from (65) the following
expression for the unconditional expectation of γ−1t+1,
(G.4) E
[
γ−1t+1
]
= µ−1γ e
σ2γ (2+η)
2 .
E
[
Q˜t+1t
]
is given by equation (71) in Lemma 2. Substituting this into (G.3) gives
(G.5) RS =
µγ
Q˜∗
e−
σ2γ (2+η)
2
−
σ2
Q˜
"
1−(1+χ)
 
η1+η2
η21+η
2
2
!#
2 .
We then derive Part i) of Proposition 5.
Consider next, a security that pays a fraction ν of the endowment ωt+1 (S ′) in state
S ′. From no-arbitrage pricing, we have that,
(G.6) qt = Et
{
Q˜t+1t
γt+1
[qt+1 + νωt+1]
}
.
Using the definitions,
(G.7) γt+1 (S ′) =
ωt+1
ωt
, qˆt(S) =
qt
νωt
,
we get the equivalent expression
(G.8) qˆt = Et
{
Q˜t+1t [qˆt+1 + 1]
}
.
The realized return from holding a risky security is then given by the expression
(G.9) Rt+1,Rt =
γt+1 [qˆt+1 + 1]
qˆt
.
Taking the unconditional expectation of (G.8) using (G.2) yields
(G.10)
1
E(Q˜t+1t )
=
E [qˆt+1 + 1]
qˆt
.
with E(Q˜t+1t ) as given by equation (71) in Lemma 2. Consider now the return to a
risky security (G.10). Using equation (67), we easily derive the unconditional expec-
tation of the risky return
(G.11)
RR = E
{
γt+1 [qˆt+1 + 1]
qˆt
}
= E {γt+1}E
{
qˆt+1 + 1
qˆt
}
=
µγ
Q˜∗
e
−ησ2γ
2
−
σ2s[η21+η22−(1+χ)(η1+η2)]
2(1−χ2) .
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We then derive Part ii) of Proposition 5. Finally, taking the ratio of (G.11) to (G.5)
gives
(G.12)
RR
RS
= E {γt+1}E
{
γ−1t+1
}
= e
σ2f
1−η2 = eσ
2
γ .
This establishes Part iii) of Proposition 5. 
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